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MEASURES OF STRESS BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL MONEY
MARKETS
Section 1. Need for Quantitative Estimates
(1) In Chapter V various devices were introduced that per-
mitted judging the nature and extent to which the chief money
markets conformed to a behavior pattern widely held as charac-
teristic. The fluctuations of the exchange rates could be checked
against the limiting position of the gold points, and the interest
rate differentials against a position defined as"permissible" in
terms of the gold standard principle. However there is an inter-
dependence between the two approaches that has not yet been
elucidated.
A method can be devised that allows a far more comprehensive
description of the mutual relationships and of the individual be-
havior of the money markets. The method is quantitative and
objective within certain assumptions. These are, first, that the data
are accurate enough to warrant therather elaborate measure-
ments; and, second, that the principles of thegold standard are
correctly formulated, and that they can be extended to periods
when a modified gold exchange standard was applied.
The crucial assumption is, as usual, the first one. Since much
has been said about the quality of the data on various occasions,
it is sufficient to emphasize once more that there is a morevigorous
standard, on the basis of which they should be rejected, that it is
easy to assume this attitude,and that it is, as far as one can see,
impossible to replace the data by something substantially better.
While bad data ought to be rejected mercilessly, there aredata
that allow a fair amount of operations that may evenlead to the
discovery of new relations and measurements, perhapsthrough the
collection of a new type of material for future purposes.The
following constitutes an experiment that may or nay notbe suc-
cessful, but is definitely worth trying.
In considering the interdependence of bothelements, we go
beyond the attempts made by Weill and others(cf. Chapter V) to
determine violations of the interest ratedifferential alone. Ve have
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treated gold point violations by themselves; this isappropriate
(though incomplete) because of the particular role assigned tothem
in monetary theory. But the absolute limits of the differentials have
meaning only for part of the function played by the differentials.
These limits are certainly violated, when the differentialsgo
beyond their absolute bounds, but there are other violationstoo.
One more consideration is important:it would obviously be
essential for this entire study to have information about the balances
of payments of the various nations and in particular abouttheir
pairwise relations and movements of accounts and assets. Suchin-
formation definitely does not exist in any acceptable formfor the
period before 1914. Those constructions and statementsencountered
in the literature are what is euphemistically knownas "reasoned
guesses or estimates." They cannot form the basis of timeseries,
nor otherwise be used in combination with data thatwere sub-
jected to more exacting requirements. Yetour understanding of
these periods would be immeasurablyincreased if some informa-
tion of this type were available. Now it is possiblethat the series
computed for this chaptermay serve as a reasonably successful
substitute. They will allow at least thedetermination of the direc-
tion in which most likely changesin the balances of pairwise
transactions occurred.' It willeven be possible to group three
countries against each singleone, so that an idea of the changes
in the whole balancecan be formed. This is due to the fact that
the four nations, without doubt,transacted with one another by
far the largestpercentage of their total transactions. Thereader
will have to judge for himselfwhether he can followus in the
use of the subsequent series; he will hardlydeny, we hope, that
they do have interestingproperties deserving attention.
Section 2. The interconnectionof Erchange Rates
and interet Differentials
(2) We proceednow to an important application of thegold
point statistics that willat the same time put themin much better
perspective than could be donein the preceding tables. Thisin-
volves a return to the solidarityhypothesis, as previously developed,
1Th1s will not allowus always to determine turningpoints, because the functions are often not definedwhen they appear tooccur. However it will usually be possible, fortwo or three successive months,to say whether an upward or downwardmovement has taken place.EXCHANGE RATES AND DIFFERENTIALS
especially pp. 166 if. There it was shown that the risk in transferring
funds from one country to another under a gold standard depended
at least on two factors: (a) the distance between the gold points
(possibly to be modified by other considerations pertaining to
observed smaller fluctuations of the exchanges within these points),
and (b) the duration of the loan.
A few words are necessary about condition (b). A difference
of thirty days or even less is very significant for the solidarity
assumption, since in each case a greatly different interest rate
differential is involved for covering the exchange risk. Furthermore
the situation is different for the various pairs of countries, since in
some instances shorter and in other longer periods may be in-
volved. A particular difficulty is offered by the LondonNew York
relationship, where the choice is between the New York commercial
paper rate with its time period of two to six months and the New
York call money rate, which in its renewal form may be used for
any indefinite short-period operation. This latter rate was at the
basis of most, perhaps even all, operations which were carried out
in "joint account" between some of the most closely associated
London and New York investment houses (not necessarily mer-
chant bankers). We have considered ranges from thirty days to
one year.
(3) The necessary operations are carried out in Tables 74 and
75. There, for each of the six pairs of countries, the following
relationships have been computed: we express the distance between
the upper and lower gold points as a percentage of parity. If
these gold points are correct and if the exchange rate cannot or
does not fluctuate beyond them, then this percentage is the
maximum exchange rate risk under those conditions. It will be
covered if for an investment of one year's duration the difference
in interest rates is at least that percentage. For investments of
shorter duration the differential may go to correspondingly higher
values.
Now it is clear that if one cannot be sure of "the" gold points
itis entirely impossible to form valid opinions about the per.
missible differentials. But we can make alternative calculations
short of establishing time series for the gold point variations
and at the same time observe the influence of differences of
information about the gold points upon the permissible differentials.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.MEASURES OF STRESS I
For each pair of countries Table 74 gives fourentrie: first, the minimum distance between all observed goldpoints in Table3:3 is taken; this is clearly the most unfavorablecase that can be
constructed for which any factualsupport can beadduced....it would support the argument of those whobelieve that goldpOiIts were too close.2 Second, the differentials for themedians of gold
points are computed. Theseare based on o'.ir statistics,depen(I on the number of observations, and would bedifferent ifwe had been able or willing to includemore data. Third, themaximum width of the observed goldpoints was taken. This isas extremea case as the first one and would perhapsbe supportedas showing
true conditions by those who mightargue that the gold pointsWere wide enough, not imposingany undue restrictions. Fourth,the maximum range of the observedexchange ratewas taken, as if it were indicative of gold points. Thatis to say, weassume here that the exchange rates couldnever go beyond the goldpoints._in COnformity with thoseviews discussed abovein pp. 241 if. and that therefore theobserved maximum widthof the gold pointsis not really the "maximum,"at least in thosecases where theex. change rates went beyondthat maximumas they did forevery pair of countries at leastonce in the prewar period,as a glance upon Table 74 will show.It could happen,of course, thateven then the "maximum"gold pointswere never reached by theex- change rates, inwhich case thepercentage for the latterwould be smaller. Since,however, gold hasalways moved atone time or the other, even in thoseinstances, this could betaken asa proof of thestatement made in ChapterV that goldmovements do not occursolely at theprecise gold points,but before they are reached. Thisexcludes asa possible indirectapproach the taking as goldpoints those exchangerates at which the goldexport and importstatistics showa specie movementacross the border. In Table 75,which is builtupon the same principlesas Table 74, there are insome cases fewerentries. This is simply'due to the fact that further dataare lacking or thatthose usedare so com- prehensive andrepresentative thata search for further datawas unnecessaiy
For each of thesefourgroups (or less) thepercentage width
2 Ofcourse those sharing thisview may havein mind very differentgold points; it is onlyargued thatnone close, to each otherhave beeti 101111(1 byus. There probablyare no others.
31n Table 75 thereare severalexceptions to this (see below).
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was determined,which gives the maximal permissible differential
for an investment of 360 days.This percentage was computed for
the paiity base of the respectiveexchange rate as well as for the
upper and lowergold point base, i.e., export or import point, al-
though the differences among thesethree are entirely negligible,
as will be seenby comparing the last three columns.4 Thenthe
corresponding differentials were computedfor shorter periods than
one year, down tothirty days. If we knew the duration of the loans
involved, it would be possible with theknowledge of the gold points
exactly to determine the maximumpermissible interest rate differ-
entials between any two countries.This attempt has been made
by several authors; but there areother closely connected questions
that require attention first.
Tables 74 and 75 lend themselves to agood graphic representa-
tion. This is carried out inCharts 24 to 29. There, on the x-axis
the duration of the loan isshown and on the y-axis thedifferential
for the four methods of theirdetermination. For reasons of economy
we give chartsonly for the classical gold standardperiod before
World War I.
A number of importantrelationships must be pointed out
briefly; for the rest, the tablesand graphs are self explanatory.
Each differential is the maximumpermissible and is given as an
absolute figure, i.e., neglectingthe sign. For each standof the
exchange rate between the goldpoints there is a definiteplus and
minus interval for the interestrate differential, butthe absolute
permissible difference is alwaysthe same and indicated in our
tables.
(4) A test of the solidarityhypothesis must therefore bemade
in two successive steps: todetermine whether absolutedifferentials
occurred in excess of the limits set;and whether there wereviola-
tions when the exchanges werenot at the gold points.The first
test is simply to seewhether an absolutedifferential greater than
the one permitted for thewidth of the gold pointsand the dura-
tion of the loan everoccurred. If that happened,then we had a
"violation." Their number wouldobviously not be exhaustive,al-
though highly characteristic. Forcompleteness the second testmust
be made, which has to takethe stand of the exchange ratebetween
'Some differences that mightbe observed in thesetables are due only to
rounding out of figures often infourth or fifth decimals.Another correction
would be necessary regarding theparity, because its valuedepends upon cable
transfer, three-month bills, etc. Butthis revision is so smallthat in view of the









Maximum width of goldpoin
Median width of goldpoints
Minimum width Of goldpoints
6072 90 120 180
Assumed duration of loan,by days
Source Table 74. The readerwill find data for thepostwar period in Table 75. For description ofchart see the accompayrngtext.
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the gold pointsincludingthem!into consideration.This entails that a given short-termdifferential even well belowthe stated absolute permissiblemaximum may bea "violation" at one ex- change rate andnot at another. Thereason for thisis simply that so farwe have considered onlythe absolute value of the
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CHART 25
Permissible Limits of Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials,
Prewar, 1880-1914
Franc.Unitsd Stot.s
306072 90 120 180
Assum,d duration of loon, by days
Source; Same as for Cbart 24.
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Permissible Limits of Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials,
Prewar, 1880-1914
G.t*anyUnit.d Sot
Assumed duration of loon, by doy
Souxce: Same as for Chart 24.
312
360
in both directions, thoughof course with differentprobabilities at the various exchangerates, the availablemaximum difference is distributed as plus andminus deviations in thedirection of both countries. The total differencemust never exceed thepermissible limit, but the determinationof the latter foreach individual stand of the exchangerate has to be workedout separately. This is done later in the chapter.At presentwe are still concerned withthe cruder over-all picture.




Maximum width of gold pO.nt
MCdtOn width of gold points
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CHART 27
Permissible Limits of Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials,
Prewar, 1880-1914
G.rmonyGr.ot Brit&n
so6ó72 90 120 180
Asiucid duration of loon, by dQys
Source: Same ii for Chart Z4.
very high since Tables 74 and 75 show what greatdivergences in
permissible limits occur, when only slight variations in assumption
or information occur.
Consider, for example, the case of Paris and New York before
1914. Taking the most "unfavorable" condition, i.e., the minimum
width of the gold points, we have 4.00 per cent at ninety days,
but a more than 50 per cent higher figure, 6.06 per cent, at sixty
days. Which shall be chosen, in view of the contradictory evidence?
At the median the two figures are 5.34 and 8.12 per cent respec-
lively. But perhaps the choice is even between 6.05 and 9.22 per
cent? If we accept the teachings of many economists that the
exchange rates can never go beyond the gold points, then the lati-
tude even increases (at least!) to 9.59 and 14.72 per cent respec-
tively. That can hardly be in conformity with a "fettering of the
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Mosimum wtdth of gold POints
-'Medion width of gold points
Minimum width of gold points
.---. ----
30 60 7290 520
Assumed duration of loon, by doys
Source: Sonic as for Chart24.
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ions of economistsshall be chosen?What (other) specificfacts did theseeconomists have in mind,if any, since theycould not possibly have beenthese?
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CHART 29
Permissible Limits of Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials,
Prewar, 1880-1914
306072 90 120 180
Asum.d durotfon of Ioon b days
Source: Same as for Chait 24.
Table 74 carefully from this point of view. He should note in
particularas can also be seen from Charts 24 to 29thesignifi-
cance of the spread of the threegold points.
It is of especial importance to observe that inall prewar cases
the percentage width evenofthe widest gold points is smaller than
that of the widest exchange rates,5 i.e., if we takeasshown in
Table 74the widest exchange rates actuallynoted as indicating
the gold points, then we find those "goldpoints" considerably
farther apart than those called "maximum goldpoints," which were
directly established from our various gold point sources.It should
he particularly remarked that this occursalso, and to no mean
extent, for ParisLondon, which wehave repeatedly had occasion
to single out from all pairs as thatbest conforming with the general
This is of course another way of stating that violationshad occurred.
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Maximum range observed
Moximum width of gold points
-"Med(an width of gold points




ideas of a smooth-working gold standard relationship, orat least
showing good covariation of monetary series.
It is also noteworthy, indeed curious, that the smallestinteraj
of gold points anywhere is 0.39 per cent and occurs before191-i
for New York-London; in the postwar period the smallestis, for
the same pair, almost twice as largeO.70 per centandno other
postwar percentage is as small as the above-mentionedsmallest
prewar value. It was undoubtedly the relation with NewYork
which the British (postwar) Critics of the goldstandard had
chiefly in view, since the stresscame from New York and_-toa
lesser degreefrom Paris, which put London underpressure.6 The
minimum width of gold points with Paris after World \Var Iwas
indeed only 0.49 per cent, instead of 0.56per cent before 1914.
This latter figure was, incidentally, the smallestof all theprewar
ones and as far as we know there was no particulardifficulty in
the relations of London with Paris. On thecontrary, as has been
pointed out on various occasions, Pariscame to the assistance of
London several times.
The most noteworthy and by farmost surprising observation
is the following: consider thepercentage width of the maximum
range ever observed for the exchange rates in thetwo periods. Now
we know that in all instances of theprewar period the exchanges
went beyond the farthest known goldpoints to the extent in-
dicated. The same occurredin the postwar period with theex-
ception of Berlin-London and NewYork-London. In the first in-
stance, Berlin-London, the widestrecorded exchange rateswere 0.83 per cent apart, butat their maximum width the known(ac- ceptable) gold pointswere 0.98 per cent apart. In the second
instance, the widest recordedexchange rates were 0.82per cent apart, but the maximum knowngold points were 1.54per cent
apart. Gold movements tookplace during this period;thisvas to be expected, as previouslymentioned, because reparations and
'Such pressure as therewas probably arose from the postwarstabilization of sterling at theprewar parity and the subsequentineffective deflation in the United Kingdom. Neitherwas inherent in the gold standard.But these matters are often inexcusably confused;sometimes this may have beena deliberate political maneuver. Atan)' rate the confusion shosildnot occur in scientific publications.
To what extent the stressmaterialized in actual gold lossesis a matter to be discussed separately. Thereneed not alwa%S bean actual loss of gold to make a central bank feeihighly
uncomfortable especiall%' whenit is difficult to make internal adjustments thatwould help toremove Ihe threat of undesired gold losses. But all thisrequires special consideration(cf. Chapters IX and XI).
316EXCHANGE RATES AND DIFFERENTIALS
enormous loans were movingbetween these two capitals and great
stress was often experiencedin each. More interesting even, the
observed excesses of exchange rate maximum range overthe gold
points in all other instancesafter the war is far smaller (absolutely
and proportionately) and far moreinfrequently observed than
those before the war!
Now if it was possible for theexchanges to go beyond the
widest known gold points, then it is curiousthat they did not
move at least asfar after the war as before it, whenperhaps
because of this incorrectbehaviorthe gold standard was not
thought to hamper unduly the cyclical orsecular development of
the respective economies, whileafter the war it was so judged in
some countries. At any rate we arehere and now confronted with
a strange mixtureof unexpected fact7 and inconclusive opinion,
the latter moreover not clearlyrelated to another body of fact that
might conceivably have escapedattention or discovery in this
investigation.8
(5) In view of the difficulty ofobtaining information about the
term of loans in foreigninvestment, the following thought suggests
itself: do the averages of the six interestrate differentials give a
clue as to that period? In otherwords, are the averages of the
differentials plausibly characteristicof one of the critical periods,
e.g., 60, 72, 90days?
From Tables 74 and 75 weobtain Table 76.
Assuming first that the averageindicates the period of invest-
ment, we see from Table74 that this assumption isimpossible
to make because forthe first two pairs the average islower than
even the mostunfavorable, i.e., smallest, differentialfor one year's
investment. For ParisBerlin we areeither below the median
gold point width or betweenthe smallest width intermediatebe-
tween 180 and 360days. The three last involve NewYork and
the average would bring usvaryingly up to 120 days, assuming
the minimum gold points asvalid. This too is unsatisfactory.Al-
though the typical loan periods maydiffer from one pair of countries
to another, the differences appearto be far too large togive the
desired clue.
'The information about maximumgold point width for the postwarperiod
is at least as good as thatbefore 1914. Hence the factthat the exchanges did
not go beyond the maximumpoints has nothing to dowith a possible deficiency
in the data.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.EXCHANGE RATES AND DIFFERENTIALS
Assuming, second, that the maximum differentialobserved in-
dicates the period of investment (on theground that Table 74 deals
with the theoretical maximum differentials only, whichmight only
occasionally, if ever, have been attained by the movementsof
the two short-term rates), we see thefollowing: the observed
paris-London maximum would place the duration around 72and
90 days for the minimum and mediangold point; this is not un-
reasonable. For Berlin-London it works forsomewhat longer
periods; Berlin-Paris would place it at approximately72 to 100
days respectively. The three relations involvingNew York9 shorten
the required investment periods even further to 60days and less,
depending on the gold points chosen. The mediansof the gold
points would obviously suggestthemselves first. It is clear that this
approach is superior to the first one, but it is notentirely satis-
factory. The results do not give periodswidely different from
those mentioned in the original descriptionsof the interest rates
(see Chapter III). For many economicinvestigations this might
be considered a satisfactory level of accuracy.But here we are
dealing with very fine measurementsthat exclude ready accept-
ance.
There is finally a third possibilityeven tobe combined with
the preceding onewhich howeverinvolves an extension of the
solidarity hypothesis beyond the domainof short-term investment
for which it was originally intended.There seems to have been
no extension of itanywhere in the literature, but it suggestsitself
readily. If long-term international investments areconsidered, then
the year is necessarily the upper limit towhich the hypothesis
can be applied, sincewithin the period of one year allpossible
exchange rate risks under the goldstandard are met by interest
rate differentials. The extensionhinges of course entirely10 upon
the likelihood that a wideningof the (yearly) differential for long-
term loans beyond the gold pointscould not persist, because it
would give rise to a flow offunds, especially gold, until the
differential went down to the extentof the exchange rate risk
as determined by thewidth of the gold points, so therecould be
no different differential.If this is acceptable, all that is necessary
is to determine the maximaldifferential observed in order toinfer
which gold points are correct
'Including the New York call money rate.
Besides assuming that the long-termand short-term rates are simply inter-
related (see Chapter IX).
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Similarly a permissible interest rate differential was defined, the
criterion being derived from the width of the gold points. These
differentials may sometimes reach the maximum that the rules of
the system assign to them and, as we saw, they may even overshoot
those bounds. If that happened, it was considered a "violation"
of the underlying principle and taken as an indication of some
abnormality or critical occurrence, or both (cf. pp. 303 if.). Like
the position of the exchange rate, the existence of a large difference
between the short-term rates of A over B is an indication that A
is making an effort to hold onto its funds or to attractfunds from
B. Country A therefore makes an effort or exerts a pressure, orboth.
From the sign of the differentialthe permissible limits being stated
in absolute valuesand from the direction of change inmagnitude,
one may infer the source of the stressbetween the two countries.
The construction of the effort series may be illustrated by means
of an example (cf. Charts 30 and 31). Then an interpretationwill
state the assumptions and limitations for all six casesconsidered.
We show LondonParis and LondonNew York.The example we
discuss refers to London and Paris before 1914, based onthe Paris
exchange rate on London and the excess of the Paris openmarket
rate over the London discount rate onthree-months bank bills.
The gold points are 25.125 to 25.327 fc per £and hence the
maximum differential for ninety days is ±3.24 per cent.On Charts
30 and 31 the exchange rates are shown on thevertical axis, with
limits being set by the gold points. The interest ratedifferentials
are shown on the horizontal axis.Charts for all pairs of countries
were made uniform byadhering to the following: when the
exchange was A on B and the differential A over B,the exchange
rate on the chart runs from rising tofallingreading from the top
to the bottom of the chart. Whenthe exchange was given as A
on B but the differential as B overA, the reverse procedure was
used, i.e., on the chart the exchange rate goesfalling to rising
reading from the top to the bottom. In ourexample the London
gold export point is at the top of thechart and the Paris gold
export point at the bottom."
The next step is to account for the maximumpermissible interest
rate differential, which is ±3.24 per cent.We express the range
"It will be recalled that we have alwaysasstnned the export point of one
countly to be the equivalent of the importpoint of the other. While this is









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the differentialcan assume for each particularposit ion ofthe exchange rate asa percentage. At [lie London gold
export point the permissiblerange is from 0 to +3.24per cent. Shouldit i exceeded in either direction, thiswould constitutea violatjoj is now seen what theconsequences are of tying inthenotion of a "permissible" differentialwith the simultaneousstand of the exchange rate: previouslyonly an excess ofover ±3.24per cent was a "violation." But with therate at the Londonexport point, any positive difference of Londonover Paris (in the chartequiva. lently a negative ofParis over London)would constitutea viola. tion,'2 since London,in the possiblemaximumappreciation of sterling alone, is alreadyoffering a completecompensation for the risk factor.' On theother hand, since theentire interval of3.24 per cent is available, it isnecessarily at the dispositionof the other countly to which gold is(potentially) flowing,in thiscase Paris. If the Parisinterest rate should be3.24 per centover the Lond0 interest rate,we may say that Parisis exercisingits maximum permissible pull and call thisa 100 per cent effort. Ifthe difference is zero, then Londongoes to its maximum effortalso of 100per cent. The twocenters are alwaysengaged insome sort of "tug ot war and it isa plausible normalizationof the situationto assign a zero valueto the midpointbetween the two100 per cent marks. In thepresent example it fallsat 1.62 percent. The pull exercisej by eachcountry has to bedistinguished fromthat of the other. Rencewe call the pullexerted by A "plus"and that of 13 "minus"._.whenthe differentialis A over B.This is purely notational.
At the Paris goldexport point exactlythe reversesituation is
'That is, since thepound could notfall any further(if the gold standard were to continue) thenforeign investorscould not loseon the exchange part of their transaction.Hence even equalinterest rates in Londonand Paris should have induceda movement of fundsto London sincethe yields would beequal in both cities, butin addition itwas impossible tosuffer an exchangeloss by moving funds toLondon; in factthere was almosta certainty of exchange profits, since thepound wouldprobably risesomewhat from itspresent mini- mum rate.
' Thisassumes that theexchange ratemay actually swing allthe way to the otherextreme (as wassometimes thecase ). A more refinedapproach might consider the mostprobable futurepositions of the exchangeassociated (after ninety daysl) withthe givenosition allowing forwhatever seasonal influences might beoperating upon hofactors. This isa highly complexsituation, and the execution ofsuch a legitimate
program (which couldeasily be made still more complex)would involvetremendous labor,hardly warranted bythe relative poverty ofthe statistics.A furthercomplication ismentioned below.
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found. The range of the permissible differential is 0 to 3.24 per
cent, where 0 to 1.62 per cent corresponds to aneffort of 0 to
+100 per cent for Paris and 1.62 per cent to 3.24 per centto
an effort of 0 to100 per cent for London.
The corresponding four points of ±100 per cent for the twogold
points can now be connected, as well as the zeroline and all inter-
mediate points. We obtain therefore the skew linear patternof
chart 30. Along each line the same effort is registered. Toillustrate:
as the exchanges movefrom the London to the Pans export point,
in order for Paris to maintain a 100 per centeffort, i.e., Paris
making her maximum pennissible effort, thedifferential Paris over
London must move along a straight line from +3.24 per cent to0
per cent. Correspondingly inorder for London to maintain 100
per cent permissibleeffort, i.e., 100 (cf. above), the differential
must move along a straight line from 0 per cent to3.24 per cent
as the exchange rate movesfrom the London to the Paris gold
export point. The zero line is thatof indifference, where the two
efforts just compensate; the differential mustthen move from plus
to minus 1.62 per cent. Yetalways, whatever the exchange rate
may be, provided it remainswithin the gold points, the absolute
permissible width remains at 3.24 per cent.
If the interest rate differentials overshootthe permissible limit,
the function is, strictly speaking, no longerdefined. But it is a
natural procedure to extend the parallel linesof equal effort beyond
the 100 per cent line. This is of coursesomewhat arbitrary and
the reader may disregard any use madeof values over 100 per
cent. However Charts 32 to 38will show numerous violations,
and the statistics are of considerable interestand significance. If
the exchange rates overshoot thegold pointsand we know that
this too has happened frequently (cf.Tables 55 to 60)then it is
not possible to extend themeasurement. The function is then
no longer defined. Inthose cases no extension whatever ispossi-
ble'4 and none will be shown in thelater applications. As a con-
sequence cycles cannotbe defined either if an exchange rate goes
beyond the gold points. It was shownthat this was a frequent
occurrence (within thedefinition and accuracy of theExed gold
point statistics). Thus the effortseries, while they do exhibitoften
strong and extremely interestingcyclical movements, do not lend
"It would be interesting tospeculate whether an extension couldbe
achieved by defining acompensatoryinterest rate interval for agold point
violation. But thic is an artificial constructionwhich is best omitted at present.
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CHART 32Percentage of Permissible EffortWarranted by
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CHART 38
Percentage of Permissible EffortWarranted by ExchangeRate and Short-Term Interest RateDifferentials Postwar
Six Pairs of Marleis, 1925-1931
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DESCRIPTION OF THE METHOD
themselves to the establishment of continuouscycles. For some
pairs, however, long continuousperiods emerge and cycles can be
measured, and the points of discontinuity areof course themselves
important as indicating aparticular kind of stress.
(7) The effort series wereconstructed on a monthly basis in
spite of the great laborinvolved. But the underlying phenomena
are sovolatileand it is generally believed that they arehighly
"sensitive" to disturbances andstimulithat a monthly series
seemed desirable.'5 They wereobtained by inspecting for each
month both the position of theexchange rate and the corresponding
simultaneous differential and thendetermining from the chart for
the pair of countriesconsidered on which line of equal effortthese
two values wouldlie. This percentage value was thenentered as
the figure for the month. Sincethere are six pairs of countries
and a total of 4,240 months,this meant collating 25,440 observa-
tions in order to obtainthe new data. On these the followingcharts
and interpretations are based.The final series wereplotted on
Charts 32 to 38. Where violationsof the exchange rates occurred,
blanks were left; however it isindicated which country madethe
violation. It is noteworthy thatthey are not always due tothe
country toward which theeffort series moves. This is in part an
indication of inability todistinguish between effort and pressure
as already noted.
The method requires severalspecific assumptions, notablyabout
gold points and about theduration of loans governedby the
rate of interest. Theuncertainties about gold points wereextensively
discussed in Chapter V. If widergold points were chosen (butthe
same duration ofthe loan, i.e., ninety days),the curve of per-
missible effort would have beenflatter than that shown onthe
charts. Many points of violationsof the gold points would nowfall
within the 100 per cent bandand more continuous curveswould
obtain, making determinationof cycles easier becausesharp peaks
would appear within thedefined zone. If narrowergold points
were chosen the curveswould be steeper with attending conse-
quences.16 If a longer loanperiod were chosen, thewidth of the
'5In fact even a month is a longtime inten'al. We dealwith averages which
smooth many subsidiary movements.This was repeatedly stressedbut must
be emphasizx1 again in view ofthe many violations the chartsshow. A finer
division of time would show many morewhich are now submerged becauseof
compensatory movementswithin the monthly averages.
'5Some of the changes wouldbe so small as to beimperceptible for all
practical purposes. This method,like any other, can give onlyrough approxima-
tions and one must beware ofspecious accuracy beingunposed or demanded.
333,1!,.S(7RES 0)' S'IRESS
limitS of till' PCI iiissihle dilleieiitials would be ilariowerci. 'fabh
74) Pt0dh1('Im a greater nmimlwr oliolatu'ns of permissible ef1o,
amid a stee1jer curve. If a slioi-ter pt'r od were clii isemi,I lie cui's
wouldl)(' flattervitli fewer violations. Our ('lmICe of ilin('tv days
SCCIflC(I to correspond with gencial information al)omIt a'flatter
concerning which little detail is known.
Fo mdicate the formidable dilflculties of measurement iiithis
field, we finally mentiomi the following: (luring the long I)('ri(1s
COiISI(ICfCd, the gold points (alI(l the loiiii p(0(I5 )un(loIil)te(llv
underwent frequent variationsan(lperhaps developed certain
trends. The 1)rescnt method should therefore he applied to these
varying coii(litioiis. 'ihis would mneaim the construction 1 if a Separate
l)as!c-l;nc diagram (like Chart 30) for ('aell gold point and loan
period varmation, instea(1 of liNing Ofllone for the whole period.
It is less time costly and laborious process nwolved that we shmnilcj
like to stress, but rather the drastic simplifications associatedeven
with the elaborate procedtmre actually chosen. '[his isan Occasion
where the ecomiomist can realize how raw our (lataare and ho'
treriiendously measurements may be unproved.
The six series finally constructed arc listed in Iablc 77 for the
two Periods l)cf ore and after 1914.
Section 4. Interpretation of lime Effort Series
(8) Since time value of the series lies in their over-all1)ictmmre of
time behavior of themoney' markets, and since they are to be
StlI)Plementcd by general information of the tYpe containedin the
appcndix to this book, the discussions'ill be brief and limited in
scope. Charts 32 to 38 enable the reader tousc' the information as
fully and as accuratelyas may be desired. We shall make a muimber
of general remarks, pointingup the behavior of the series and
the main changes, andpresent some frequency distributions, iii-
dicating chiefly the iniportant factthat continuous violations, i.e.,
exceptional stresses, were quite frequent.Various correlations of
the series with other sets of data\'ere attcmptc(i but were not Very'
fr titfuil. Obviouslyno correlation can be expected withany of the
constituent series, although certain resultsmay lead to the same
interpretations, e.g., characterization of thebreak iii l)ehavior in
the prewar andpost-\Vorld-War_I periods. Noteworthyisthe


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Theoretically it ought to appear. Its failure to emergeniay perhaps
be due to the apparent inaccuracy of the gold series.'
Interpretation of 'she series may conceivably be made interms
of equilibrium. Sace we have pointed out thevagueness of the
notion of equil;irium for exchange rates and interestrates, there
is little to be expected from the use of the idea here. Thereader
however may interpret differently.It will he agreed thatthe
large variations that appear frequentlyare an indication of the
need for adjustment and that continuous maintenanceof excessive
positions, especially when they are actually "violations,"are an
indication that the machinery of adjustment is workingpoorly. For
many series there is, in the twentieth century,a marked tendency
to fluctuate more closely around thezero line and to changemore
frequently from one side to another.'8A similar behaviorwas
found for the maximum short-terminterest rate differentials.
Charts 32 to 38 contain the effortseries 18784914 and 1925-1931
for the six pairs of countries. Theyuniformly show thesame thne
intervals and scale for thepercentage deviations. It is arbitrary
which country is assigned theupper or the lower part, and the
plus and minus signsserve only to distinguish the numbers for
each entry. On the side of eachmoney market the arrows indicate
the reference cycle turningpoints for that country. While theseare
important bench-marks, neithercorrespondence nor lack of it should
be too severely interpreted:the present series showprimarily in-
ternational relations, andone of the basic ideas was toconstruct series that might exhibittensions in nature different fromthose
measured by reference cycles.While there must beinterrelations between the two, thenew measures are stillso tentative that they must be used with greatcare. The gold point violationsare also shown and it is indicatedwhich market committedthem. Mostly they are violations bythe country towardwhich the effort series swings in an extreme fashion.That this is not alwaysthe case may
'7See my "Validity ofInternational Gold MovementStatistics," bc cit. ' New YorkBerlin shows forthe period before 1914an exceptionally good behavior for a long time.On the basis of otherevidence we know tht their contact was comparatively slight,and therefore theiractual transactions pro- ceeded in an atmosphere ofcaIn,, which doesnot exclude that each market was often in a perturbed condition.If New YorkLondonshow slight variations, it isdifferent; there thevolume of transactionssteadily increased as greater harmony descended. Thisshows that still anothervariable, the volume of trans- actions, ought to be introducedquantitatively in order to arriveat correct interpretatjons..an obviousimpossibility, because thereare no data and there would be too many variablesto handle at thepresent level of analysis.
336I
THE EFFORT SERiES
be due to faults inthe data or to quite exceptional circumstances.
In general it isplausible that a country against which the effort
series is movingindicatingdifficulties arising from its contacts
with the other (but possibly extending tothird or fourth parties)
should also let the exchange rate slip beyondthe gold export
point.
We shall now discuss in abroad sense the main properties of the
six series. Each shouldbe compared with the data in the final
appendix and with Table 140 giving a list ofstock market panics
and their internationalramifications. The discussion is mainly in
two groups. thefirst involving New York, the second, London.19
(9) (a) New York isparticularly interesting. It developed only
gradually into a well-functioningmarket, but its operations were
always important. The gradualimprovement of communications
with Europe is a factor in the slowestablishment of "normality."
New York nearly alwaysshowed a tremendous effort, hardly ever
letting the effort series go over tothe side of the other three
countries. Violations of theprinciple were the order of the day,and
they are mostly of a continuous sort(see Table 78 for details).
Nevertheless even in the forbidden zonechanges occur and con-
siderable cycles20 can beobserved. Many critical periodsand
moments stand out clearly,and in all three contacts themost
difficult period for the NewYork money market was1892-1896.
These are the years which beginwith the silver agitation andend
with the victory of the gold standard(cf. the final appendix).They
include furthermore the terriblecrisis of 1893. The sensitivityof
the series is really astounding.Also many other well-knownevents
are quite sharplydepicted. After about 1900all three series in-
volving New York begin tosettle down, albeit (withthe exception
of Berlin) at a level higherthan where our zeroline runs. This
may mean that our zerois not correctlychosen, but it is more
likely to be an indication thatNew York was stilllaboring hard to
1'The reader should bear in mindthat the series are notindependent from
each other. It was shown how thesix interest ratedifferentials anse from
four basic series by subtractions.The interdependence ofthe exchange rates
was discussed in ChapterV. Now these two setsof interdependent series are
combined with each other by use of aprinciple that links themstill further:
the gold points into which the interestrate has entered,which in turn depends
on the gold pointinterval, if the rate isconnected with those of other countries,
as we assume. Theserelationships could beformalized mathematically, but
this digression is omitted here. .
Their standard determination isimpossible because of thediscontinuities
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CHART 39Percentage of Permissible Effort Exerted by New York and icndo
Ezcu of the New York Commercialp
1878 '79'80'8182'83'84'$5'8$'$7'se'$g9o'9'92'93'94 '959
attract and hold funds. We can conclude this from observing the
position of other series (not involving New York) around their
zero lines.
The postwar period is in all series only measured for 1925-1931,
because of the subsequent abandonment of the gold standard by
England, exchange control in Germany, antigold legislationin the
United States, etc. (an extension might be possible withsome
modifications). The picture Is interesting and insome instances
puzzling The main effort this time is by Berlinand London, but
New York'to pull, especially vis-I-vis London, from the
middle of 1927 on. London counteracts in1928-1929 and succeeds
in lowering the series again, helped by repeatedviolations of the
gold points. The great Cermain crisisof the middle of 1931 is clearly
heralded from the second half of1930 on. Similarly the iner
balance of payments difficulties Londonhad to face shows up
from the end of 199on.
In order to form a better Idea of theeffect of variations in the
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a p1minoi e,chGnQe rate for AuQ.-SIPt.i914.
data two experiments weremade (for New Yorkalone). First, the
New YorkLondonbalance was computedfor the commercial paper
rate (as in allprevious cases) byassuming aseventy-tW0daY
loan period and substitutingthe maximum widthof the gold points
for the median,which is used in all cases.Second, computations,
as above, weremade, using the call moneyrate instead ofthe
commercial paper rate.In both cases, aselsewhere, the usual
seasonal corrections weremade.2' The firstmodification (Chart 89)
flattens the seriesconsiderably and putslarge parts inside the100
per cent limitsthat were formerlyoutside. Now only afew un-
defined points due togold point violationsremain, so thatfull
cycles might bedetermined for manycontinuous years. Butthe
over-all pattern remainsthe same, as comparisonof this chart with
Chart 33 will show. Inthe second series(Chart 40) the NewYork
call money rateintroduces a new factor:in spite of the twoelements
VThis may be quiteobjectionable with series ofsuch high sensitivity,sharp
but unsteady peaks, andtheir consequent easytranspositiOns etc.I
CHART 40Percentage of Permissible Effort Exerted by New York and
London,
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working towardflattened ('tirve. hie\V sitar1) sifl[4hllari)(iiIhlS occur.
a iwavs on tite Ncs' 'iork side.lll('SCarc' inure ck'arlvtSS(
vtth pantes011(1Siiiiilar c]istiirbaiiccs titan thenitIrt'gi.tciii:tInulls
shown in Chart 3.3, which howevern'gistt'rsoil these singular
periods too. On previousOccasions the iok' of the callittoiiev
rate 1)0(1 been pointed out andit was found tlt;tt there waslit)
1)articlllar advantage in tisilig it. Thisis ('( lhlhril)('d11)a general
hr this exPeriment. Oii the otherliaii(1Ihere is0151)Ill)Ol)jeCtP1)
regarding the Stll)Stitution, providedthe uenei-al Iiinitat10115
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countries; it was mainly inthe United States that thecall money
rate played such anexceptional role, just as it wasonly in this
country that new investmentwas largelysupported by bank
credit, rather than by permanentprevious individual savings.
(b)London.Since the LondonNewYork series has already
been discussed (for threevariants), the LondonParisand London
Berlin series remain to beconsidered. The first is of primaryim-
portance and is the mainEuropean relationship.It is not very
smooth, but is ruptured by many,mostly early, gold pointviola-
tions on both sides.Where the function isdefined it shows strong
gold export point
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cycles, especially throughout the 1890's, and gives theindication
that from then on the two markets functioned smoothlyand did
not stray too badly from the bounds of the permissiblepressure
they might have exercised upon each other. Thisis in general
conformity with other evidence about the period.We knoweven
about collaboration between the two central banks,e.g., during
the Baring crisis. At any rate whatever the troubleswere that eacl
of the two markets encountered, they seemedto make little addi..
tional trouble through their behavior in regardto each other.
Neither the Boer War nor the Fashoda incidentproved to be serious
upsets. Even the Panama scandal of 1892appears as a domestic
French affair, rather thanan event affecting the London_Paris
relations. But the collapse of gold stocksin Paris in the lastquarter of 1895 is not onlyseen in greater effort by Paris, buteven casts
its shadow ahead. From 1900-1909London was pullingmost of
the time on Paris; the 1907crisis does not show up inany particular
manner. This merely means that the relativepositions of these two
markets did not undergoany significant change.
Eveiything changes profoundly for1928-1931. Although these
were not peaceful financialyears for Paris, London was probably
laboring under stillgreater difficulties. London wentas far as 300
per cent in October 1929, a value thatis exceeded on otherocca-
sions only by Berlin. This wouldindicate that Londonwas far more
shaken by the New YorkStock Exchange collapse thanany other
records indicate. (A confirmationis also found from theLondon-. Berlin chart.) The difficulttimes of 1931 that precededthe de- valuation are also heraldedproperly. The sudden pullsof Paris from October 1929 toMarch 1931) are knownto have coincided with
large withdrawals of goldby France, anda release of French bal- ances in London.
The London-Berlinseries, although in severalplaces undefined because of gold pointviolations, stays better withinthe bounds than any other. Much German financingwas done via London, especially of the growing foreigntrade. Cycles, andeven long swings, are
noticeable. 1895, 1899-1900,and 1907 standout as periods of great stress for Germany. Thefirst wasa collapse in gold shares (inter- national), in 1900caine another break ofprices on the stock market, and thegreat crisis of 1907 hitBerlin hard, as is established by independentrecords. It is interestingthat London's difficultyears (to a largeextent due to the Americanevents) of the late 1880's to the middle l890'sare even reflected inits relations with theTHE EFFORT SERIES
financially less-developed German market. However, in interpret-
ing this series, it ought to be recalled that the volume of transac-
tions was probably less than that between London on the one
hand and Paris or New York on the other. The postwar period shows
just one tremendous effort on the part of Berlin to keep going
entirely through deviations from the permissible interest interval
until the collapse came in the middle of 1931, well-heralded by our
series for about one year. The method seems to have a not incon-
siderable prognostic value.
(c) Berlin. This market needs to be discussed only in its relation
to Paris, since it was already dealt with in (a)and (b). The pre-
war series falls into two quiteclearly defined periods: up to ap-
proximately 1893 Paris made great efforts, subject to some cycles,
the largest falling into 1886-1889; from 1895 on, theroles are
interchanged and Berlin is exerting pressure. Also the gold point
violations fall neatly into these two periods: in the first partthey are
Paris's, in the second, Berlin's. Since these are independentphe-
nomena not connected with the presentmeasurement, this division
is an interesting conoboration. We dispensewith further detail
and mention that the postwar picture shows againthe now so
familiar break in the pattern. Berlin made enormous efforts(if vio-
lations of over 200 per cent can still be regarded assomething
accessible to the method) interrupted only by thereversal from
October 1929 to April 1930. Again the entire Germaneffort made
use of the interest rateonly until, in July 1931, the standaid broke
and exchange control was introduced.
Common to all these series is that the interestrate is apparently
far more flexible than the exchange rate.This is not surprising con-
sidering the rigidities with which the latter isdeliberately sur-
rounded in a gold standard. There areviolations of the gold points;
they are not better registered than thequality of both rates and
gold points permit. But there isenough persistence to the phe-
nomenon to make itprobably real. The information about interest
rates is certainly better thanthat for the gold points. Even if one
were to discard our newmethod altogether, one would findthe
variance of the interest rates andtheir differentials far greater than
In some other series a great effortof A is sometimes suddenly interrupted
by a gold point violation by B. This is notunreasonable; it simply means that
the pressure on B became too greatand the exchange rate had to give way.
There may have been institutionaldifficulties in raising the interest rate to
meet the challenge. These occurrencesinvite particular attention of thehisto-
rian.
343that of the exchange rates. So the fact remains that each country
had considerable facilities in playing with its interest rates, thatit
was not enslaved to an international situation, and that the Iflofle.
tary system found an outlet for pressures which, while technically
involving nonconformity with its principles, could be tolerated and
neither engendered distrust nor actually broke down. Thisentire
situation is full of exceedingly interesting problems that await fur-
ther formulation. The empirical basis given so far should be broad.
ened. But it is clear that a comprehensive theory of interest that
wishes to take the international factors into consideration will have
to consist of a highly complicated set of theorems.
(10) In concludng this discussion of the series, the following
experiment is also indicated:
The series measure only relations for pairs of countries. Is itpos-
sible to estimate the relationf a given money market with all others
simultaneously? This is not easy to answer. If the rest of theentire
world is considered, the method would break down, becausefor
some there may be virtually no interaction, but great differences in
interest rates may be registered, showing violations, whilethere
really is no contact. But ifwe limit ourselves to countries whose
money markets are suciently highly developed and actually
communicate with each other, an extension is not implausible.We
have carried it out for the four markets and showthe results in
Charts 41 to 44. We shall describe briefly theirconstruction and
limit the comments to a few words, since thereader can judge then
value with all the information providedin this connection.
The principle of construction is simple anda close analogy to the
one used for obtaining the series of absolute maximum short-term
differentials (Chapter IV). For each monththe greatest effort rela-
tive to a given market was pickedas representing the worst to
which the country was exposed. Successivelyin time different
markets may have been responsible butno distinction was made in
the curve, the intent being simplyto discover the greatest pull, in-
cluding that of the home market, ifsuch were the case. Because of
the reversibility of signs (of pull)in each of the six basic effort series,
it is possible to assign uniformlya positive value to the foreign pull,
and a negative to the domestic.All series are therefore comparable.23
A high positive valuemeans that the foreign countries are making
an effort, a negative otherwise for the home market.At the top is





identified the market which exerts the greatest pressure relative to
the home market; sometimes two markets may exert the same pres-
sure. At thebottom the reference dates of the home country are
marked. An advantage of the representation is also that the frequent
gold point violations (shown on the upper part of the charts) can
be studied.
New York. Before 1914 there was continuous pressure by
New York on the foreign markets interrupted in1896-1900, there-
after easing, and normalization of the situation withspecific turns
as in 1906, 1911, etc.The general tendency of gradual emergence
from very troubled conditions and development into afull mem-
ber of a well-organized international financial communityis
mistakable.
London. The picture is different. The series show a market
up to about 1897 laboringunder great foreign pressure, the worst
period being 1892-1897, due to the frequentlymentioned American
difficulties. The structurally different behavior from 1900 on,with
the frequently alternating plus and minus positions, wascommented
upon at the beginningof this chapter. The occurrence of very
sharp disturbances from the end of 1905 to1907 is particularly
noteworthy and the circumstances should befurther explored,
especially since this is not strongly evidentfrom the constituent
series. The postwar section gives anidea of the total disruption of
the international money economy, even inthat part of the postwar
time that might now be consideredalmost "classical."
Paris. This center is noteworthy forthe great and distinct
cycles prevailing up to 1900if the numerousgold point violations
can be so interpreted.From 1900 on Paris appeared tobe under a
mild pressure from abroad which, mostof the time as we know, was
never serious. With aslightly different definition of thepermissible
zone the curve wouldeasily have fallen entirely withinthe bounds
and offered a further proof of theincreasing smoothness of the
operations of international financebefore 1914. From 1928-1931
the foreign pressure on Francefar outweighed any sheexercised
during that period, even when thepreviously mentioned French
repatriation of balances fromLondon in the form of goldoccurred.
Berlin. The division occurs inabout 1904: up to then there
was mostly foreign pressurethereafter stabilization somewhatbe-
yond the 100 per cent level, for whichthe same probable interpreta-
tion applies as in the precedingparagraph.













CHART 41Percentage of Permissible Effort Warrantedby Exchange
Rate
New York andForeg5 y Greatest effort relative to New York es.srted by:
Paris..
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Source: NBER series;see the discussion in section 4, subsection10.
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Markings on top of charts identify the foreign money market exerting greatest effort
relative to the countiy n question.
Short-Term Interest Rate Differentials, Prewar and Postwar
1878-1914, 1fl8-1931














































CHART 43Percentage of Permissible Effort Warranted by Exchange
Ratesand
Londonnci Poreig,1Mork.
10(0( OLI 1 848586'87'88'89 '90 '91'92 '93'94'9'96'97'98
Effort by London.sll art by foreign (Nix York, Paris, Bertlr)a+.
Source: Same na for Chart 41.
CHART 44Percentage of Permissible Effort Warranted byExchange Rates and
Berlin and Foreign Movk.ts,
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I I , I I I t I______Zngthof
100 PER CENT 125 PER CENT 150 PCEWr
vIuwtOfl5
(months) No. Mon.ths ViolatorsNo. Months Vwlators 1% o. Afonghs









Number of Continuous Months ofViolation ofPermissible
Effort Series, Pairs of Countries
Number of Continuous Months NewYork and London Exceeded100125, and 150 Per Cent in Permissible EffortSeries




of 100, 125, and150 per centare not included in thecomputations.
(table continueson next pages)THE EFFORT SERiES
TABLE 78, continued
Number of Continuous Months New York and Paris Exceeded 100, 125, and
150 Per Cent in Permissible Effort Series
3.4
2
Total months of continuous deviation




Postwar: July 1928-December 1931,42months
Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent of total deviationsobserved
33.3 50.0




100PER CENT 125PER CENT 150 PERCENT
No. Months ViolatorsNo. Months ViolatorsNo. MonthsViolators
Prewar: January 1880.-July 1914,415 months
1' 1313New York1313New York 918 New York
2 3 8New York 918New York 1122 New York
2 8New York 412New York 2 8 New York
4 416New York 520New York 2 8 New York
5 420New York 315New York 0 0-
6 212New York 1 6New York 1 6 New York
7 214New York 1 7New York 00-
8 1 8New York 0 0- 0 0-
10 110New York 0 0- 220 New York
11 00- 11!NewYork
13 113New York 113New York
15 00- 115NewYork
16 116NewYork 0 0-






Median 5 4 1862
1' 0 0- 22New York 1 1 New York
2 12New York 00- 0 0-
3 13New York 13New York 1 3 New York
4 1 4NewYork
Total 3 9 13 1 3
Average 3 3 3
Median 3 3 3S
MEASURES OF STRESS
TABLE 78, continued
Number of Continuous Months Paris and London Exceeded 100, 125,and
150 Per Cent in Permissible Effort Series
Lengthof
violations 100 PER CENT 125 PER CENT 150 PER CENT
(months) No. Months ViolatorsNo. Months ViolatorsFj1jT1010
Prewar: January 1880-July 1914,415 months
Total monthsofcontinuous deviation
as per cent of total deviations observed
Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent of total deviations observed
60.0 40.0 50.0



















Total 1757 715 25
Average 3.4 2.1 2.5
Median 2 2 2
63.0 50.0
Postwar: July 1928_July 1931, 37 months
40.0












Total 322 211 4.5 Average 7.3 5.5 2 Median 3 3THE EFFORT SERIES
'Single deviations of 100, 125,and 150 per cent are notincluded in the computations.
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TABLE 78, continued
Number of Continuous Months New Yorkand Berlin Exceeded 100,25, and




100 PER CENT 125 psa cnr 150 PER CENT
No. Months ViolatorsNo. Months ViolatorsNo. MonthsViolators
Prewar: January 1888-July 1914,829months











12New York 28New York3














14New York 1 7New York 0
0- 1 8New York 0 0
9
New York
9 19New York 1 9New York 1
10 110NewYork 00-
ii 1iiNewYork 00-
12 112NewYork 0 0-
13 113New York 113New York
I






as per centoftotal deviations observed
80.0 78.6 76.9 Bcrlin






















Berlin 3 3Berlin - 00- - 13Berlin - 1 6Berlin



































Number of Continuous Months Berlin and London Exceeded100 125, and
150 Per Cent in Permissible Effort Series
Length of
violations 100 PER CENT 125 PER CENT 150 CENT (months) No. Months ViolatorsNo. Months Violators


















Total months ofcontjnuotg deviation
as per cent of total deviations observed
62.5 83.3 50.0
Single deviations of 100,125, and 150 percent are not included in thecomputations.
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58.3
Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent of total deviations observed
50.0



























































55London(J) 1 1 Beijin
818Berlin (8)24Berlin (4)












1440 516 1 4 2.9 3.2 4 2 3 4THE EFFORT SERiES
TABLE 78, concluded
Number of Continuous Months Berlin and Paris Exceeded 100, 125, and
150 Per Cent in Permissible Effort Series
-
Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent of total deviationsobserved





100 PER CENT 125 PER CENT 150 PER CENT
No. Months ViolatorsNo. Months ViolatorsNo. MonthsViolators
Prewar: January 1880-July 1914,415 months
P 1111Pans (1)1111Paris (3) 22 Berlin
Berlin(10) Berlin(8) Berlin
2 48Paris(3) 12Paris 36-
Berlin( 1)
3 13Berlin 28Paris (1) 00-
Berlin( 1)
4 14Berlin 00- 00 Berlin
5 210Paris ( 1)210Berlin 15 Berlin
Berlin( 1)
8 00- 16Berlin 16 Berlin
7 17Berlin 00- 0 0-





Total 1482 741 511
Average 5.9 5.9 3.4
Median 5 5 2
2
58.0 38.9










12 112Berlin 00 Berlin
13 00- 113-
14 114Berlin 0 0-
19 00- 119Berlin
20 120Berlir.
Total 234 231 325
Average 17 15.5 8.3
Median 14 12 10
Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent oftotal deviations observed
100.0 100.0 75.0TABLE 79
Number of Continuous Months of Violation of Maximum Permissible
Effort Series, Domestic Money Market and All Foreign Ceiite
Number of Continuous Months London and Foreign Centersa Exceeded 100, 125,and l per cent in the Maximum Permissible Effort Series
violatIons 100 PER CENT 125 PER CENT I50 PSRCENT
(months) No. Months ViolatorsNo. Months ViolatorsNo. Months




Loiidon( 4) Londn( 2





Foreign 1 7 Foreign
Foreign 0 0 - 1 9 Foreign
Foreign 00-





Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent of total deviations observed
56.0 55.7 47.8









Total months of contjnuodeviation
as per cent of total deviations observed
54.5 55.6 50.0
a New York, Berlin,Pails.










6 424Foreign 1 8
7 214Foreign( 1)214
London( 1)
8 00- 1 8
9 218Foreign 00
10 110Foreign 110

















3 2 6Foreign( 1)2 6
London( 1)
4 2 8Foreign 14
Total 618 514
Average 3 2.8
Median 3 3TABLE 79, continued
Number of Continuous MonthsNew York and Foreign Centers Exceeded 100, 125, and 150
Per Cent in the Maximum Permissible Effort Series
London, Paris, Berlin.
Single deviations are not included inthe computations.
1150 II,0,I.S
(months)
100PER CENT 125 PER CENT 150PER CENT
No. Months ViolatorsNo. Months ViolatorsNo. MonthsViolators
Prewar: January 1878-July 1914
lb 86New York 33New York1010 New York


























































10 110New York 220New York 210 New York
ii 111New York 111New York
13 113NewYork0 0-
I 14 114New York 114New York
15 00- 115NewYork
a 16 116NewYork 0 0-





















Median 6 4 2
80.8
Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent of total deviationsobserved
90.0
Postwar: July 1928-August 1931
69.7
lb 22Foreign 1 1Foreign 0 0










s( 2) 6 00- 1 8Foreign
n( 2) 8 18Foreign 00-
U Total 314 29 3 7
2.3 U Average 4.7 4.5
2
n Median 4 3
Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent oftotal deviations observed
60.0 66.1 100.0TABLE 79 continued



















Number of Continuous Months Berlin and Foreign Centers' Exceeded 100, 125, and 150




100PER CENT 125PER CENT 150PER CENT
No. Months ViolatoTsNo. Months Violators -No. MonthsViolators
Prewar: February 1887-July 1914
lb 1414Foreign(6)1313Foreign(7)99 Berlin (2)
Berlin (8) Berlin (8) Foreign(7)
2 4 8Foreign( 2)4 8Foreign( 3)714 Foreign(S)
Berlin (2) Berlin (1) Berlin (4)
3 1 3Berlin 412Foreign( 2)0 0-
Berlin (2)
4 520Foreign(S) 1 4Foreign 312 Foreign
(3) Berlin (2)
(1) 5 1 5Berlin 315Foreign (1)S15 Foreign( 1)
Berlin (2) Berlin (2)
6 212Berlin 212Foreign(1)00-
Berlin (1)
7 642Foreign(4)0 0- 00-
Berlin (2)
8 0 0- 1 8Foreign 0 0-







Total 26164 1887 1450
Average 6.3 4.8 3.6
Median 6 4 2
Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent of total deviationsobserved
65.0 58.1 60.9
Postwar: July 1928-June 1931
lb 22Berlin 2 2Berlin 33 Berlin
2 12Berlin 1 2Berlin 1 2 Berlin
4 00- 1 4Berlin 14 Berlin
6 16Berlin 0 0- 00-
10 00- 0 0- 110 Berlin
12 0 0- 112Berlin
13 113Berlin
Total 321 318 316
Average 7 6 5.3
Median 6 4 4
Total months of continuous deviation
as per cent oftotal deviations observed
60.0 60.0 50.0
'Paris, London, New York.
bSingle deviations are not included in thecomputation.MEASURES OF STRESS
distributionsmade from these data to throw some further lighton
the nature of these series.
Table 78 for pairs of countries and Table 79 for theaggregate
balances show the number of months for which there werecon.
tinuous violations of the 100, 125, and 150 per cent leveL They
indicate how frequently violations of more than one monthcon.
tinuously occurred and what the total number of months for each
entry actually was. They are therefore akin to Table 60, where the
gold point violations were similarly counted. The tablesare con-
structed by means of some simple rules: if the curvesgo through
the 100, 125, or 150 per cent lines, respectively, thecontinus
number of months that they stay beyond are counted and enteredin
the three columns. Single deviations beyond the three limitsare not
counted. From these data the three columns are formed. Clearly
the number of continuous violations of the 150per cent limit can at
most only be equal to that of the 125 per cent limit violations,etc.
At the bottom of these frequency distributions theaverage duration
of the continuous violations for each limit is shownas well as the
percentage of months that were continuous deviations out of all
deviations. We observe that this percentage isvery large, which
means that when the series went through one of the limits, they
did so in a thorough mannerat least, interms of time. The dif-
ferent behavior of the fourmoney markets shows up very clearly,
especially before World War I. Thepostwar data are offered more
in the nature of an appendix; the deviationsare short and infre-
quent, showing the substantial change that has occurred.
Section 5. Conclusion
(11) The discussion in this chapter hasbeen surrounded by
many reservations, and only cautious conclusionscan be drawn.
In design and interpretation theseries presented here are inter-
mediate, i.e., in thesense of goods along a production line; they
are neither raw materials nor finished products, butin a stage where
they may still be transformedinto one thing rather than another.
The same Is true for most of thecontents of this book. Or, they may
have to be discarded. Atany rate, however, the new method is a
natural outgrowth of a theory thathas been widely held and, with
more or less precise formulation, has been used bynumerous writers
in the interpretation of the mainphase of the modernmoney econ-
omy. While so far the method has not shedany decisive light uponTUE EFFORT SERiES
the spread ofnancial fluctuations fromone country to another, it
certainly has shown their interdependenceand the existence of
phenomena that agree withcommon sense. The chief among those
is that the workings of the internationalmonetary system had im-
proved greatly up to 1914 andwere tremendously upset by World
War I. Other facts, less easily interpreted,are also in evidence;
because of their systematic connection with theformer phenomena,
there is hope that they can be consideredto be a fuller account of
our experience.
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